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Abstract
The idea o f a (national) crim inal justice system as the framework fo r  the exercise 
ofpenal power is firm ly anchored in the Western discourse. At the same time, the 
science o f crim inal law does not offer any thorough normative theory o f the crim­
inal justice system as a (coherent) whole. In opposition to concepts like crime, 
responsibility or punishment, the concept o f a crim inal justice system is seldom 
dealt with, and its normative underpinnings are seldom discussed. This article 
argues that a normative theory o f the crim inal justice system fu lfils  several im­
portant functions in the development o f the crim inal law, not least with regard to 
the current restructuring o f the national crim inal justice system. From this point 
o f departure, the article provides an account o f the building blocks and methodo­
logical challenges o f such a theory.
1. Introductory Remarks
This article provides some reflections about a theory o f the crim inal justice sys­
tem. Particularly, it provides an account o f the building blocks and methodologi­
cal challenges o f such theory.2 The crim inal justice system is approached from a 
legal point o f view. More specifically, the crim inal justice system is approached 
as a sub-system to the overall legal order o f a given political society/ It is under­
stood as a specific legal system, demarked mainly through its function to exercise 
penal power, i.e., the power to deliver and implement different kinds o f authorita­
tive decisions concerning crimes and their punishment (such as through criminal- 
isation, sentencing or the administration o f punishment). From this starting point, 
the crim inal justice system is taken to include all those (legal) elements that for­
mally serve this function, such as norms concerning the punishable offences and 
institutions that officia lly  respond to the violation o f these norms.
The theory aimed at consists primarily o f a rational re-construction o f the 
(constituting elements o f the) crim inal justice system as a concept or idea, and not 
(primarily) o f a description o f existing systems as empirical phenomena. U lti­
mately, the aspiration is to elaborate a normative framework for the system, i.e., 
an overall principled structure consisting o f the general principles that steers (or 
should steer) the different elements o f the system, and their interrelations, as a
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functioning whole. The article adumbrates a constitutional perspective to the 
crim inal law. It argues that different specific principles o f the system, such as 
principles o f crim inalisation or sentencing principles, ultimately must be under­
stood as interrelated through the more basic (constitutional) principles o f the sys­
tem. That kind o f normative theory could be used to understand or evaluate exist­
ing structures o f penal power. Another thing is, and this is an important point, that 
also such theory must integrate empirical knowledge about existing crim inal jus­
tice systems.
Crim inal law theory offers discussions about different central elements o f the 
crim inal justice system, most evidently about the norms o f the crim inal law and 
crim inal procedure, and about the concepts o f crime and punishment. This article 
builds upon these discussions. However, it insists upon the necessity o f an overall 
coherent framework for the crim inal justice system, linking together (theories 
about) its different institutional and normative aspects. Such theoretical approach, 
focusing on the crim inal justice system as a whole, is to a large degree lacking in 
the contemporary normative discourse.4 It is also to an increasing degree needed 
in order to steer the ongoing development o f the crim inal law, particularly with 
regard to the reconfiguration o f the crim inal justice system that this development 
carries with it.3
2. Seeking Theory
Before proceeding into the content o f a theory about the criminal justice system, 
some further remarks should be made about the need o f such theory. I w ill first 
briefly address the current absence o f theory, and then go on to say something 
about why we should seek to develop one, i.e. to address the functions o f a theory.
The term “ crim inal justice system” is a term that we are all fam iliar with. This 
term -  or corresponding notions in different languages -  is used in almost every 
European standard book on crim inal law or crim inal procedure. In the Western 
discourse, there also seems to be some kind conventional or paradigmatic under­
standing o f a crim inal justice system. This understanding refers to the institution­
alised structure for the exercise o f penal power that has been developed w ithin the 
democratic Rechtsstaat, as the national crim inal justice system.6 This structure is 
typically understood to include both a system o f norms and an institutional organ­
isation (o f a ll those institutions that o ffic ia lly  respond to the commission o f of­
fences, such as the police, prosecutors, judges and prison services).7
But what do we more concretely mean by saying that something is, or should 
qualify as, a crim inal justice system? Could we agree on a definition in terms o f 
necessary or sufficient criteria? Could we, for instance, agree on institutions that
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must always be present? This question links further to more concrete questions, 
for instance regarding the ongoing development o f EU  crim inal law: Is it neces­
sary to establish a common European defence agency i f  we establish a European 
public prosecutor and, i f  so, why?8
The contemporary Nordic discourse does not offer any comprehensive theory 
o f a crim inal justice system that goes beyond the conventional model. Crim inal 
law doctrine is conventionally centred on problems found within the crim inal jus­
tice system (problems in crim inal law, problems in crim inal procedure, problems 
related to the administration o f punishment and so on). The concept o f a crim inal 
justice system is -  in opposition to concepts like crime, responsibility or punish­
ment -  seldom dealt w ith and its normative underpinnings are seldom discussed.9
The reasons for the relative absence o f a theory are certainly manifold. It is 
probably not without impact that the existence and privileged status o f the nation­
al crim inal justice system for a long time has been taken for granted as an overall 
acceptable structure for penal power. Another possible reason, at least from a 
Nordic perspective, is that a theory about the crim inal justice system requires a 
highly interdisciplinary approach that in some aspects challenges the convention­
al normative approach w ithin crim inal law science. The crim inal justice system is 
a complex entity in the intersection between law and society which refers to a 
multitude o f competing legal, sociological and political perspectives.10 As a legal 
entity it also transcends the sphere o f “pure” crim inal law and relates to many 
other branches o f law, such as administrative law that regulates the administration 
o f punishment. This complex character o f the crim inal justice system might in the 
end raise some doubt about the possibilities o f a theory about it.
The view o f this article is, however, that there is an increasing need o f a new 
theory o f the crim inal justice system, and that such theory should be sought con­
structed. A fter all, a theory o f the crim inal justice system could serve several im­
portant functions. The most obvious functions could be outlined as follows.
1. The “Framework ” Function'. On a fundamental level, a theory o f the crim inal 
justice system fu lfils a central role in a more complete understanding o f crime, 
punishment and its proper administration. It provides an account o f the principled 
framework o f the system and thereby communicates ideas o f how different func­
tions fit together. Several aspects o f the crim inal law are in this regard best under­
stood and studied as parts o f the structure o f the crim inal justice system. It is, to 
draw an analogy, d ifficu lt to fully understand the brain or the heart and their func­
tions without relating it to the nature o f the body itself. In order to fu lly under­
stand, for instance, the principles that steer the crim inal process, and their proper
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relation, it seems needed to understand the function and meaning o f the process in 
relation to the more basic meaning o f the system. More generally, without refer­
ence to some kind o f principled framework, the different elements o f the system 
cannot be perceived as (meaningful) parts o f a functional whole, but the system 
inescapably dissolve into a plurality o f uncoordinated norms, actions and actors.
2. The Pedagogic Function: A  theory o f the crim inal justice system can as a prin­
cipled framework also serve a pedagogic function. It could contribute to make the 
different actors o f the system more aware o f their role in this larger structure, and 
o f the requirements that follows from it. In this regard, the question is, so to say, 
not whether we should think o f the crim inal justice system as a system (at least at 
some level o f abstraction this seems inevitable), but what kind o f system we 
should consider it to be. It certainly matters whether the actors o f the system 
gives priority to strategies o f social management or to more principled accounts 
about the aim and function o f the crim inal law.11 More generally, it is o f im­
portance for the function o f the system as a whole that the different actors w ithin 
the system, such as the police, the defence or the prison services, are aware about 
how the more general principles o f the system should guide their concrete tasks. 
In other words; also from a practical and functional point o f view a normative 
theory o f the crim inal justice system is o f importance. The pedagogic function is 
above all to be realized through academic teaching, by the education o f future 
lawyers and other actors w ithin the system.
3. The Prescriptive Function: A  theory o f a criminal justice system could, finally, 
play an important role in guiding the further interpretation and development o f the 
crim inal law. Particularly the contemporary transnational development requires 
discussion o f the meaning o f upholding a certain system structure o f the criminal 
law. It is today often underlined that the national crim inal justice system -  as a 
more or less specific and autonomous system that represents certain important val­
ues -  is challenged under the pressure o f transnational legal development.12
A lso with regard only to the national level, it is important to discuss the deeper 
meaning o f having a criminal justice system. The national systems are in constant 
development due to societal, not least technological, changes. New normative or 
institutional elements are added; some old ones disappear or are removed. Techno­
logical inventions create for instance new opportunities for surveillance and evi­
dence (cf., DNA), new forms o f punishments (cf., foot-chains), new possibilities 
for communication within the system and between the system and society (cf., 
TV-trials) and also for new forms o f crime (cf., Internet-crime). However, it is not
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obvious what kind o f solutions that should be used in order to deal with these con­
tinuously new challenges (or possibilities). The conventional model has, after all, 
its limits when it comes to providing answers on such questions: The fact that it 
might be possible to trace a conventional model should not be confused with the 
adequacy o f this model. The paradigmatic status and wide acceptance o f this mod­
el could at best be seen as a symptom o f such adequacy. To provide it w ith norma­
tive force it has, however, to be supplemented with deeper rational justification.
It is here important to add that the use o f the term “crim inal justice system” 
has a certain rhetoric force. In the Western discourse this term is loaded with ide­
as and values o f the democratic Rechtsstaat, as indicators o f authority and legiti­
macy. A s such, the use o f the term in other contexts, for instance in the men­
tioned transnational context, might create associations to such authority and legit­
imacy, despite potential deficiencies. If, for instance, the structure that is devel­
oped w ithin E U  crim inal law is described as an “EU  crim inal justice system” , this 
easily implies the presence o f some kind o f autonomous, complete and function­
ing whole. Hence, the use o f this term w ill probably make it easier to gain sup­
port for the further development o f EU  crim inal law than i f  it is, for instance, de­
scribed as a multi level entity that struggles with the existence o f competing 
Member State perspectives. A lso, in order to resist that kind o f legal or political 
rhetoric a deeper understanding -  a theory -  o f the crim inal justice system is 
needed.13
4. The Coherence Function: Through the above mentioned functions, a theory 
could also contribute to the upholding and improvement o f the coherence o f the 
(positive) crim inal justice system as such. Today it becomes increasingly harder 
to understand legal problems in isolation to their specific area, such as for in­
stance in police law. Contemporary developments as outlined above, and con­
temporary challenges with regard to the context o f crim inality, in many occasions 
asks for solutions or answers that are not necessarily prescribed by the specific 
regulations at stake. A lso classical distinctions w ithin the crim inal justice system 
dissolve or become challenged, such as the distinction between police power and 
m ilitary power or between crim inal and administrative penalties. To an increasing 
degree an understanding o f contemporary problems must therefore be considered 
in relation to the system as a whole. In this regard, a theory that communicates 
how the different elements o f the system are linked together, through more basic 
principles, seem important with regard to the coherence o f the system.
Bearing these different functions in mind, it is now time to provide an account 
o f the content o f a theory o f the crim inal justice system. I shall in the rest o f this
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article lim it m yself to provide the contours o f different supplementing building 
blocks and methodological perspectives that seem needed in order to develop 
such theory.
3. Building Theory
3.1. Methodological Starting Points
This article approaches theory o f the crim inal justice system as a matter o f nor­
mative reconstruction o f its principled structure. The crim inal justice system is 
primarily sought understood through the elaboration o f a coherent framework o f 
general principles that prescribes the system’s needed content, i.e. its constituting 
elements. Basically, the principles determine the systems’ content, by either pre­
scribing certain elements, such as the presence o f certain norms (such as norms 
that defines punishable offences, prescribes certain procedures or certain forms o f 
punishment), functions or institutions (such as the function o f investigation or the 
presence o f a defence), or by governing the relations among such elements (such 
as the relation between substance and procedure).
The theory aimed at, in other words, provides an account o f the principles that 
steers, or should steer, the crim inal justice system as a whole. Methodologically it 
claims to represent a (internal) legal perspective by being anchored in basic con­
stitutional principles and values. The theory also builds upon existing discussions 
about different aspects o f the crim inal law and its institutionalised setting and in­
sists upon linking these aspects together in a coherent framework. In the end, 
however, a principled framework o f the crim inal justice system, as well as its 
constitutional foundation as such, must be understood as anchored in rational ar­
gumentation. In this regard, a theory o f the crim inal justice system is inevitably 
philosophically founded. A t the same time such theory must abstract from, and 
must draw upon knowledge about, the content o f existing systems and their social 
and cultural settings. A s w ill be developed below, it is not possible to construct 
theory o f the crim inal justice system in isolation from such “reality” .
A  central element in a theory o f the crim inal justice system concerns the no­
tion o f a “ system” . In brief, this article carries the argument that the systematic 
character o f the crim inal justice system is in essence a matter o f a certain unity, in 
terms o f coherence, among its different elements.14 In this regard, an elaboration 
o f the principled framework o f the system is an attempt to further explain its sys­
tematic character.
A t the empirical level, contemporary literature reflects some doubts as con­
cerns the systematic character o f existing crim inal justice systems. Some authors 
have even suggested that the crim inal justice system is a non-system -  even
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though there is a w idely spread agreement that current crim inal justice systems at 
least to some degree work as systems when it comes to securing social control by 
means o f norms and punishment.15 These discussions have, to a large extent, been 
focused on how different actors w ithin the system are co-ordinated and interde­
pendent in their practices, and not on the principles that steers (or should steer) 
the system and its components.16 This sociological dimension o f the crim inal jus­
tice system is a far-reaching subject that I w ill not explore further in this article. 
Notwithstanding the systematic character o f existing crim inal justice systems, my 
theory w ill start from the assumption that such a system should to a high degree 
function in accordance with a principled structure.
The conventional model o f a crim inal justice system seems to integrate certain 
aspirations o f such a principled approach, although not explicated through a more 
complete theory. A t least, this model refers to the idea that the system contains 
specific normative and institutional elements that have to interact in a specific 
way in order to put effect to the crim inal law. Moreover, the conventional under­
standing refers precisely to a structure o f more or less articulated basic ideas and 
principles regarding the deeper meaning o f the crim inal justice system, which in 
essential aspects are expressed in the ideas o f the system’s norms and institutional 
organisation.17 The aim o f general prevention seems fundamental in this regard, 
as it is conventionally considered both to justify a crim inal justice system as such 
and to at least to some extent guide its institutional and normative content -  alt­
hough it is unclear how this aim interplays with more specific functions at differ­
ent institutional levels o f the system. More generally, the basic ideas and princi­
ples embedded in the conventional model, mainly centred on justifying the insti­
tution o f punishment (e.g., principles o f responsibility), are to a large extent de­
rived from the basic values o f the democratic Rechtsstaat.
Furthermore, the claim o f some kind o f a principled structure is in legal theory 
presented as inherent in the idea o f law, deriving from basic constitutional val­
ues.18 This is, not least, seen w ithin the domain o f crim inal law doctrine where 
the crim inal law is basically approached as a coherent body o f rules, concepts and 
principles, deriving from basic constitutional requirements. Follow ing this tradi­
tion I shall argue that any claim o f penal power must correspond to certain basic 
system requirements. The principled character o f the system is in the end under­
stood as a criterion for its legitimacy.19
It is, however, part o f the problem when developing a theory o f the crim inal 
justice system to answer to what degree it has to be a principled structure and 
what kind o f principles it should be constructed from. What has the system to be 
like, in its constituting elements, in order to provide legitimate decisions about
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crime and punishment? It seems quite clear that the crim inal justice system can­
not adequately be understood only as a principled and normative structure. It 
must to a large extent be understood also as a social and cultural phenomenon. 
The elements o f any legal system must, in this regard be seen as impregnated by 
the system’s specific historical, economic, ideological or political settings.20 
Therefore it is central when developing a theory o f the crim inal justice system to 
find out to what extent a crim inal justice system is contingent on culture, and 
whether, or to what extent, there are values and principles that are universally 
prescriptive and therefore necessary elements o f any crim inal justice system.
I w ill now proceed towards an answer to this question, by providing some 
thoughts about the building blocks o f a theory o f a crim inal justice system. First­
ly, I w ill provide some notes on the fundamental structure o f the crim inal justice 
system as a structure that is claimed to be found in, or that could be abstracted 
from, any system that exercises penal power. From this starting point, I w ill then 
further elaborate on the needed content o f a crim inal justice system, in terms o f 
general principles that any system should be structured from. Such general prin­
ciples ultimately reach beyond the positive law and must be anchored in some 
dimension o f morality, which could be seen as internal or external to the legal or­
der.21
3.2. The Fundamental Structure o f the Crim inal Justice System 
On a methodological level, a fundamental structure is ultimately claimed to be 
empirically founded in a ll existing legal orders that exercises penal power. It 
should, however, be noted that even though a fundamental structure is empirical­
ly observable in all existing systems, it is not (only) motivated by empirical 
grounds. It is a structure that is almost conceptually implied by the idea o f public 
administration o f punishment.
A  fundamental structure could, however, only be reconstructed at a very high 
level o f abstraction and is therefore almost empty o f information concerning the 
content o f the system. The specific content o f the system must to a significant ex­
tent be understood as a matter o f cultural differentiation.22 Or more precise: The 
crim inal justice system must in its totality be understood as a cultural phenome­
non that functions and evolves in a given cultural context. Some structural as­
pects could, however, be understood as common to different legal cultures and in 
this sense “ fundamental” , while others could not. It seems clear that, when 
searching for concretisation, there is significant variation in the normative and in­
stitutional content o f existing crim inal justice systems. Different systems have at 
least to some extent various crime provisions, different institutional organisation,
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different rules o f imputation, different ways o f perceiving and regulating the in­
terdependence between substance and procedure and so forth.23
The crim inal justice system could in its fundamental structure in itia lly be ap­
proached by means o f three different components that represent different basic 
building blocks o f the crim inal justice system. These components are the sys­
tem’s essential meaning, its basic concepts and its basic functional elements. The 
latter could primarily be divided into normative functional elements (norms) and 
institutional functional elements. These different components are strictly speak­
ing different perspectives on the crim inal justice system and cannot be separated 
nicely from each other. It is, however, important to understand the specific role o f 
each element in order to understand how the system’s more concrete structure 
and content is formed. Furthermore, it should be noted that in a complete theory 
o f the crim inal justice system these components might be supplemented with oth­
er elements that are claimed to belong to a fundamental structure. M y claim in 
this article is in this regard lim ited to the articulation o f some central dimensions 
o f a theory, taking into account that there might also be others to add. Having 
clarified this, I w ill now further explain the different fundamental elements o f the 
crim inal justice system.
The essential meaning could be described as the constitutional meta-principle 
o f the system. The principled framework o f the system is ultimately understood 
to be organised around and anchored in such meaning. This viewpoint should not 
be confused with the argument that the crim inal justice system could be under­
stood in terms o f one distinct purpose alone. A t a more concrete level, the crim i­
nal justice system typically embodies a multitude o f different aims and values. 
The overall aim for the police might, for instance, be formulated in terms o f 
maintenance o f safety, security and order in society and a more concrete purpose 
o f the investigation might be to clarify i f  the conditions for imposing crim inal lia ­
bility exist.24 A  central argument o f this article is, however, that without adhering 
to some kind o f deeper meaning it is impossible to conceptualise the crim inal jus­
tice system as a coherent whole.
Furthermore; one thing is that any crim inal justice system must be understood 
through an essential meaning. Another thing is what the essential meaning is un­
derstood to be. Any crim inal justice system could, probably, be understood by 
reference to the punishment o f crimes. I f one asks for a more substantive under­
standing o f the essential meaning, existing and historical systems provide for a 
multitude o f suggestions, such as societal utility, retribution or effectuation o f 
sovereign w ill. Therefore, when it comes to adding substance to the meaning o f a 
crim inal justice system, it seems as it is no longer sim ilarly adequate to speak o f a
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fundamental structure. I shall, however, argue in the follow ing that in terms o f a 
principled structure a crim inal justice system is essentially about the protection o f 
individual autonomy.
The basic concepts could be understood -  as in the words o f George P. 
Fletcher -  as the conceptual grammar o f the crim inal justice system. The most 
basic concepts o f the crim inal justice system are the concepts o f crime -  the vio­
lation o f a norm designed to secure certain interests -  and punishment as the re­
sponse to a crime. It seems impossible to speak o f a crim inal justice system, or to 
explain its different elements, without adhering to these concepts.23 A lso any 
opinion on the needed content o f the system, at least to a significant degree, w ill 
rest upon the understanding o f crime and punishment (and their relation), an un­
derstanding which in turn depends on the essential meaning. The conventional 
model rests, in this regard, upon the understanding o f punishment as conceptually 
tied to crime as wrongdoing, an understanding that, for instance, links to certain 
principles for criminal liability.26 Regarding the more specific understanding o f 
the concepts o f crime and punishment, and their interrelation, existing crim inal 
justice systems reveals a m ultiplicity o f different perspectives. For instance the 
systematisation o f the prerequisites o f punishability differs also between systems 
with sim ilar legal traditions.27 Except for the concepts o f crime and punishment 
there are other concepts that have this kind o f status as conceptual premises o f the 
system. The concepts o f guilt, responsibility and (criminal) justice are obvious 
candidates.
The basic functional elements are centred on a basic principle that prescribes 
that the system should be functional in regard to implementing the meaning o f the 
system. The essential meaning and the basic functional principle could thus be 
described as intertwined in a requirement that a crim inal justice system functions 
in a way that reflects its meaning. There are certain elements that seem required 
in any system that exercises penal power. These elements could be viewed as 
necessary parts o f any functioning crim inal justice system, as needed functional 
elements, and could as such be described as its spine or skeleton. I suggest the 
follow ing elements as basic functional elements.
1. The function o f norm creation -  Identification o f crimes (and their
punishment) at the norm level
Firstly, there is the elementary function o f norm-creation, in the meaning the act 
o f identification o f certain behaviour or actions as crimes, and o f certain kinds o f 
punishment. This function is conventionally associated with crim inalisation and 
the institution o f the lawmaker.28 But norm creation could also take place at other
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“ levels” or institutions o f a crim inal justice system, such as within a court.29 Fur­
thermore, it should be noted that the function o f norm-creation requires an actor 
performing it, which in turn presupposes some kind o f competence-giving norms. 
According to the conventional understanding, the crim inal justice system is sub­
ordinated to certain constitutional procedures and/or norms for the process o f 
law-making. The function o f norm creation, in the end, also refers to ideas o f 
crime and punishment and related concepts, since the understanding o f these con­
cepts steers the identification o f relevant norms.
2. The body o f norms
Secondly, any crim inal justice system must contain codified or non-codified gen­
eral norms about crime and their punishment, most typically as a result o f an act 
o f norm-creation. It also seems reasonable to add norms about procedures to this 
category. The point is, however, that if  it at all should be adequate to speak o f a 
system, there has to be some kind o f general norms defining the punishable of­
fences. Without such norms all that remains is an aggregation o f different kinds 
o f violent actions undertaken by those in control. The body o f norms might also 
refer to norms o f a higher constitutional character that are not unique for the 
crim inal justice system but that are valid in this system as a part o f a more general 
constitutional order. In this regard, the conventional model perceives the crim inal 
justice system as a sub-system to the legal order o f the (nation) state, and as such 
subject to certain constitutional principles.
3. The functions o f the application and implementation o f norms
a) Investigation o f crime
b) Judgment on crim inal responsibility and punitive response (cf. adjudication o f 
punishment)
c) Administration (execution) o f punishment
Finally, any crim inal justice system is centred on functions or procedures for the 
application and implementation o f general norms in concrete cases. More specif­
ic, any system embodies the function to protect the interests behind the norms by 
means o f realising the threat o f punishment when crime is actually committed. 
This function o f application and implementation o f norms typically embodies, 
above all, three sub-functions: The functions and procedures o f a prelim inary 
identification o f crime, i.e. investigation into possibly committed crimes, o f judg­
ing on whether a crime has been committed, including questions relating to re-
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sponsibility and punitive responses, and o f administrating or executing the con­
crete punishment.
A ll these different elements o f a fundamental structure are, in terms o f a theo­
ry o f the crim inal justice system, to be understood as necessary but not sufficient 
elements. In order to elaborate further on the principled structure o f the system, 
these basic elements must be concretised with regard to more specific normative 
departing points, and also with regard to the more specific working premises o f 
the system. In order to proceed towards a thicker theory it is, in other words, 
needed to add substance. In doing so, I w ill in the follow ing further discuss the 
principled framework o f the crim inal justice system, by further clarifying its es­
sential meaning and its cultural elements.
3.3. Adding Substance: The Princip led Framework
3.3.1. Autonomy Protection as the Essential Meaning
The essential meaning o f a crim inal justice system is to be found in the value to 
protect individual autonomy (cf., human dignity and equality) that more generally 
underlies the democratic Rechtsstaat. This value is the foundation o f international 
declarations on human rights (eg., ECHR, E C FR  U N  Declaration o f Human 
Rights), as well as o f every Western constitution, and could as such be seen as a 
primary constitutional principle. The value o f individual autonomy is also the de­
parting point and ethical foundation o f Western crim inal law. The crim inal law is 
constructed from the idea o f the individual as a being with capacity for autonomy 
and responsibility. It should, however, be clear that the perspective adumbrated in 
this article is based upon a substantive conception o f law, and on a substantive 
perspective o f legitimacy, according to which the binding force o f law ultimately 
lies in its (moral) legitimacy. In the end, the adequacy o f adhering to the value o f 
autonomy protection as the essential meaning o f the crim inal justice system can 
not be defended on empirical grounds, such as by showing its status in positive 
law. Its adequacy must ultimately be defended in terms o f rational moral argu­
mentation as the foundation o f the entire legal project.30
3.3.2. Understanding Function through Meaning: Deriving Specific Principles 
The basic substance o f the crim inal justice system could, at a high level o f ab­
straction, be understood through the value to protect individual autonomy as a set 
o f basic (constitutional) principles. A ll specific principles that steer the content o f 
the system, and its different elements, are to be understood as anchored in, and 
interrelated through, these basic principles. This means, for instance, that specific 
principles that steers the administration o f punishment (such as principles con-
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ceming the reintegration o f prison inmates) and crim inalisation principles (such 
as principles o f proportionality) must be possible to explain as interrelated at a 
higher constitutional level.
There are basically two kinds o f principles that could be derived from the val­
ue o f autonomy protection; positive principles that aim at crime prevention (or 
crime control) and negative or lim iting principles that aim at prevention o f abuse 
o f power?1 The positive principles prescribe what is needed in order for the sys­
tem to secure the horizontal aspect o f autonomy protection between individuals in 
society. The negative principles lim it the extension and content o f the system and 
thus primarily refer to the vertical relation between individual and political pow­
er. The relation between these two categories is generally so that positive princi­
ples motivate the existence o f different normative or institutional elements as 
such in the crim inal justice system, while the negative principles enter in regard 
to each o f these elements, as lim iting requirements as regards form and content.
Through these basic principles o f autonomy protection the needed functional 
elements and principles o f the system could be further elaborated. The overall 
question at stake is how the basic principles could be differentiated into more 
specific principles about the required normative and institutional elements o f the 
system, and their interrelations. In order to reach a theory, such principles must 
be elaborated at each level o f basic functional elements, i.e., with regard to the 
function o f norm-creation, the body o f norms and the functions o f the applica­
tions and implementation o f these norms. Such an exercise requires answers on a 
multitude o f different principled questions, at each functional level. What kinds 
o f institutions or procedures are, for instance needed with regard to the creation 
o f penal norms, and according to what principles, i f  any, should this function be 
structured?32 Or: what principles should steer the administration o f punishment, 
such as imprisonment?33
It seems quite clear that the aspects o f crime prevention and prevention o f 
abuse o f power have different impacts and concrete manifestations on different 
functional levels o f the system. They may for instance be transformed into differ­
ent kinds o f principles o f evidence at a judicial level or into a more general re­
quirement o f high rate o f crime disclosure. It seems also reasonable that the sys­
tem does not in each specific function account for a “perfect balance” between 
different needed basic principles, as long as the system as a whole secures such 
balance. But a core question is then: according to what principles should the d if­
ferent functional elements interplay in order to secure a defensible whole?
In providing an answer to this question, a theory o f the crim inal justice system 
must elaborate a set o f principles w ith regard to the crim inal justice system as a
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functioning whole. In this regard, a theory o f the crim inal justice system links to 
the different discussions in and about the crim inal law that has been centred on 
deriving principles from the Rechtsstaat foundation. The discussion on general 
principles o f the crim inal law is central in this regard, as it offers insights on prin­
ciples o f criminalisation, responsibility, and sentencing.34 In addition there are 
valuable contributions concerning the principled framework o f the crim inal pro­
cess.33 The discussion on basic constitutional principles, and particularly on hu­
man rights, is also o f significance.36 A  theory o f the crim inal justice system links 
together these existing discussions in a coherent principled framework.
In elaborating such a framework, a theory o f the crim inal justice system must 
generally take into account different kinds o f empirical knowledge when the ar­
guments at issue presuppose or refer to such knowledge. Sociological knowledge 
is for instance central to the understanding o f the nature o f the societal problems 
that the crim inal law refers to; how are for instance contemporary phenomena 
such as terrorism, organised crime or trafficking really to be understood? And the 
idea o f individual responsibility as a premise for crime at least to some extent re­
quires knowledge concerning our capacity to act as responsible beings, a discus­
sion that relates to for instance neuroscience and psychology/7 In this regard em­
pirical knowledge ultimately operates like a test for validity o f the theoretical 
model at stake. This remark links us to a more basic insight about the empirical 
dimension o f the crim inal justice system -  an insight w ith impact on the content 
o f a theory about it.
3.3.3. Em pirical Elements: The Crim inal Justice system between Facts and Norms 
A  crim inal justice system cannot be understood at the normative level alone, but 
must be understood as a phenomenon in the intersection between facts and 
norms. A t the same time as such system is always built upon certain basic (nor­
mative) principles, it is inevitably characterised as being an instrument for im­
plementing principles into a given social reality. A  crim inal justice system func­
tions (and should function), in other words, also as a social system. In its empiri­
cal dimension, the crim inal justice system is built upon certain working premises 
that is not universal, but to a significant degree dependent on culture, society and 
tradition. Such empirical premises are, for instance, the existence o f certain social 
problems (cf. crime rates), prevailing political and legal ideologies, available 
economic recourses and established institutional structures and practices. In this 
regard, also our most basic intuitions about crime and punishment, at least to cer­
tain extent, seem related to social mechanisms.38 The differences between exist-
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ing systems, in the systematisation o f the prerequisites o f punishability are here 
noteworthy.
This insight has implications for the possibilities as such to conceive a “thick­
er” or more substantive theory o f the crim inal justice system. A t least it seems not 
possible to elaborate upon a more comprehensive principled structure without in­
tegrating a component o f cultural openness, taking into account also the systems’ 
success in being functional in a given social setting. A  principled structure must, 
in other words, be constructed from both (more) deontological and culturally con­
tingent elements.
The only way to proceed towards a more substantive theory is therefore to fur­
ther elaborate basic principles and fundamental functional elements in light o f 
knowledge about the working premises o f existing crim inal justice systems. The 
elaboration o f more concrete principles requires at several points a deeper under­
standing o f the interplay between norms and culture in the crim inal justice sys­
tem, as well as o f more concrete manifestations o f such interplay. In this regard, a 
central question is how our intuitions o f crime and punishment are affected by 
social or cultural mechanisms. The concepts o f crime and punishment are also 
more generally central to a theory, as these concepts offers methodological key 
perspectives for the understanding o f the crim inal justice system. These concepts 
have references to many different discourses on crim inal law, and also links to 
different cultural traditions, and limitations, regarding how to punish and what to 
define as crime. General principles concerning, for instance, forms o f punishment 
must in this regard be elaborated through a deeper understanding o f these dis­
courses, and their interplay.
The principled framework o f the crim inal justice system must, more generally, 
in several aspects be developed by means o f evaluation o f the continuous devel­
opment o f the crim inal justice system as a societal institution. Apart from the 
contributions offered by other empirical research fields, contributions from com­
parative crim inal law seem here to be o f particular importance. Comparative re­
search provides examples o f how basic principles could be transformed into spe­
cific  functional solutions in a crim inal justice system, such as, for instance, the 
basic principle o f effective crime control might support the use o f D N A  surveil­
lance. A t some level o f concretization, it is reasonable to believe that different so­
lutions have less principled relevance.39 In other words, at some level o f concreti­
zation, several solutions seem possible w ithin the principled framework o f a 
“crim inal justice system” . It is here worth noting that the conventional model re­
fers to a paradigmatic understanding that is shared by the existing Western (na-
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tional) crim inal justice systems, systems that in many aspects differ in their more 
concrete normative and/or institutional solutions.
In the end, the cultural contingency o f the crim inal justice system raises some 
doubts about the possibilities o f a more substantive theory. Does not such a theo­
ry after all have to be a theory about a specific system or system context? A t least 
it seems like a true challenge to develop principles for the content o f a crim inal 
justice system that could be universally understood and adopted. This challenge 
has obvious references to the transnational legal development, a development that 
is at the apex o f contemporary changes w ithin crim inal law. Therefore it is, as a 
final remark, interesting to note that this development in fact challenge the para­
digm o f the national crim inal justice system. It is, however, in no ways obvious 
whether this implies a (theory o f a) crim inal justice system that transcends na­
tional boundaries, or i f  it rather implies that the development o f transnational 
crim inal law has been taken a step to far.
4. Concluding remarks
This article has provided some initial thoughts about a theory o f the crim inal jus­
tice system, thoughts that could -  and should -  o f course be discussed further. 
The construction o f a more substantive theory o f the crim inal justice system must 
after a ll be seen as a project that asks for wide-ranging research collaboration. 
This project must include research w ithin crim inal law and its different disci­
plines, legal theory more generally and, to a significant degree, also contributions 
from many other fields o f knowledge. Given this magnitude o f the project, one 
might be tempted to simply leave it behind, particularly when taking into account 
the fact that we are perhaps striving to achieve the impossible. However, given 
the important functions that a theory o f the crim inal justice system fulfils, this is 
not a preferable alternative. And perhaps the magnitude o f the project only makes 
it more fascinating after all.
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